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I. INFORMATION POLICY AND INFRASTRUCTURE 
Inscribed on the main post office in New York City there is a 
famous motto: “Neither snow nor rain nor heat nor gloom of night stays 
these couriers from the swift completion of their appointed rounds.”1 It 
has become the unofficial slogan of the U.S. Post Office.
2
 But the Post 
Office did not invent this famous saying. It is from the Greek historian 
Herodotus.
3
 He was describing an elaborate system of horseback 
messengers created by the Persian monarchs to keep in touch with the 
reaches of their vast empire.
4
 Herodotus reports that the great Persian 
King Xerxes used the couriers to report back to the capital that he had 
lost a major battle.
5
 
Xerxes‟s system of couriers was an early form of what we might 
call a knowledge and information policy. Persian kings needed a reliable 
system for sending information securely across vast distances. So they 
created an ancient version of the Internet for their personal use. 
All states throughout history have had knowledge and information 
policies. The earliest goals of these policies were to maintain state 
power, to execute military campaigns, to engage in surveillance and 
espionage, and to promote national security. Every nation-state in the 
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world today, whether democratic or authoritarian, has knowledge and 
information policies, even though the technologies have changed greatly 
from King Xerxes‟s day. 
Most governments in the history of the world, like Xerxes‟s Persia, 
have been autocratic. Control over information, technologies of 
communication, even the education of the public, have been designed to 
serve the interests of the ruling classes. 
The emergence of democracies changed the purpose of knowledge 
and information policy. In a democracy, sovereignty rests in the people. 
But if the people are the rulers, they need information in order to hold 
their representatives accountable. The public needs access to information 
about public issues, and about what government officials are doing in 
their name; it needs relatively inexpensive ways to communicate with 
other citizens, organize, discuss, protest, and form public opinion. In a 
democracy, political legitimacy necessarily depends on the free flow of 
information, and on the maintenance of a robust public sphere of 
discussion and opinion. In fact, the first democracy in Ancient Athens 
also pioneered techniques for spreading information among its citizens.
6
 
The Framers of the U.S. Constitution were men of the 
Enlightenment. They assumed that representative government required 
people to be able to debate public issues; they believed that the growth 
and spread of science, art, and learning would benefit society and 
increase practical freedom. They understood that democratic self-
government depends on a democratic knowledge and information policy. 
Even before the First Amendment and the Bill of Rights were added 
in 1791, these Enlightenment ideas influenced the design of the 1787 
Constitution. Article I, Section 8, gives Congress the power “[t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries.”7 The Progress Clause was designed to 
decentralize and democratize innovation and information production. 
Instead of relying on royal patronage to generate art and science, or tie 
up innovation through royal favoritism and crown monopolies, Congress 
wanted to use markets to create incentives for intellectual production and 
diffusion of knowledge. For the founders, the purpose of intellectual 
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The 1787 Constitution also gives Congress the power “[t]o establish 
Post Offices and post Roads.”9 A democracy, especially one extending 
over such a large area, needed people to stay in touch with each other, 
not just with government officials. Good roads and a good mail system 
were essential to self-government in a large republic. 
Two of the most important early decisions by the new national 
government involved knowledge and information policies. Anuj Desai 
has written about their history.
10
 At the time of the founding, newspapers 
were often delivered by mail to different parts of the country. Congress 
created a special postal rate for newspapers to encourage the spread of 
news and opinion, educate the public, and promote communication of 
ideas and political cohesion throughout the republic. Congress imposed 
higher rates on business and personal correspondence to subsidize lower 
rates for newspaper delivery. A version of this cross-subsidy exists 
today, although it has largely outlived its usefulness because most people 
no longer get their newspapers delivered by mail. 
The second major decision, also ratified in the 1792 Postal Service 
Act, was data security; when mail was delivered by the U.S. Postal 
Service, government officials could not look inside people‟s mail 
without a warrant.
11
 Although the official English practice was that 
postal officers would not read private correspondence, it was not always 
followed, and during the Revolution people feared that insecure mail 
would lead to discovery that they were disloyal to the British crown.
12
 
European absolute monarchs probably felt even less compunction than 
British civil servants about opening and reading the correspondence of 
their subjects. By protecting informational privacy, this early policy also 
protected conscience and free expression. This principle is not 
recognized as a constitutional guarantee until many years later. It starts, 
however, as an information policy of the early American Republic that,  
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together with postal subsidies and post roads, creates the beginnings of 
what I will call an infrastructure of free expression.
13
 
II. DEMOCRATIC VERSUS AUTHORITARIAN INFORMATION POLICIES 
It is not an exaggeration to say that modern states are informational 
states: states that recognize and solve problems of governance by 
collecting, analyzing, and distributing information. Knowledge and 
information policy is at the heart of government today.  
Knowledge and information policy is about far more than the 
protection of free expression. Modern governments provide social 
services and benefits to their citizens, like social security, Medicare, and 
veterans‟ pensions. This requires vast data processing systems to 
compile statistics and distribute benefits. Modern citizenship requires 
data processing in order to distribute the benefits of citizenship, and this 
leads to the creation of vast government databases, which, in turn, 
creates the need for privacy regulation, another important information 
policy. Governments also invest heavily in public education because it is 
crucial to democratic citizenship. Governments subsidize the production 
of information, like agricultural and weather information, as well as 
geographical data. And, especially in the United States, governments 
subsidize most basic scientific research. 
You might think that information states must tend toward 
democracy. But it is not so. East Germany had an enormous information 
collection apparatus—the Stasi—but it certainly was not democratic. 
Today, China‟s knowledge and information policies are designed to keep 
the Chinese Communist Party in power while growing China‟s 
economy. 
The big choice we face today is between democratic information 
states and authoritarian information states.
14
 Different countries lie on a 
spectrum between these two ideal types. 
Authoritarian information states are information gluttons, 
information misers, and information monopolists. They try to collect as 
much information as they can, but they do not share it with their people. 
They try to monopolize control over information in order to serve the 
interests of those in power. 
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Democratic information states, by contrast, are information 
gourmets, information philanthropists, and information decentralizers. 
They collect only the information they need for governance, and they do 
not keep information secret any longer than necessary. They not only 
willingly share information with their citizens, they also create 
information and knowledge for their citizens to use and enjoy. 
Democratic information states try to ensure that their citizens have ample 
opportunities for education; they promote access to knowledge and 
information in order to form public opinion and to keep government 
officials in check. Democratic information states also decentralize the 
production of knowledge and information because this promotes 
democratic self-government. 
Many people are optimistic that the Internet and the digital age will 
make authoritarian government increasingly difficult if not impossible. I 
am not so sure. In fact, as I will describe shortly, it is possible for 
authoritarian states to use the Internet and digital technologies to create 
digital versions of authoritarian information states. More troublingly, it 
is also possible that the Internet will tempt democracies like the United 
States to adopt increasingly authoritarian knowledge and information 
policies out of fear of terrorism and in order to protect interests in 
intellectual property. 
Justice Hugo Black gave a pretty good account of a knowledge and 
information policy for a democracy. In a 1945 case called Associated 
Press v. United States,
15
 he argued that “the widest possible 
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is 
essential to the welfare of the public, [and] that a free press is a condition 
of a free society.”16 “Diverse” means that we should decentralize 
information production and information distribution. No one entity 
should control knowledge production, many people must participate in 
creating information, and it should be widely distributed. “Antagonistic” 
means that knowledge production should be structured to allow the clash 
of different viewpoints, and to encourage dissent and innovation. 
Therefore, governments should protect and foster institutions, like the 
press, universities, and scientific research, that can check facts, produce 
new forms of knowledge, and help guarantee the quality and salience of 
information. 
Associated Press involved an agreement by newspapers to limit 
access to information to their members and create barriers to entry by 
                                                          
 15. 326 U.S. 1 (1945). 
 16. Id. at 20. 
6 HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1 
other news organizations.
17
 The members of the Associated Press argued 




Justice Black disagreed. The Associated Press was using its 
monopoly power to stifle competition in the gathering and dissemination 
of news. Justice Black argued that the same values that prevented the 
government from restricting the flow of information also gave it the right 
to regulate powerful private interests when they interfered with “the 
widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and 
antagonistic sources.”19 As Justice Black put it, “[i]t would be strange 
indeed . . . if the grave concern for freedom of the press which prompted 
adoption of the First Amendment should be read as a command that the 
government was without power to protect that freedom.”20 Justice Black 
explained: 
Surely a command that the government itself shall not impede the free 
flow of ideas does not afford non-governmental combinations a refuge 
if they impose restraints upon that constitutionally guaranteed freedom. 
Freedom to publish means freedom for all and not for some. Freedom 
to publish is guaranteed by the Constitution, but freedom to combine to 
keep others from publishing is not.
21
  
Today we live in a world of large and powerful corporations that 
shape and control the production and flow of knowledge. Many of these 
players now use the First Amendment to challenge regulation of their 
business models and to limit competition in the marketplace of ideas. 
Justice Black‟s opinion in Associated Press reminds us that the First 
Amendment protects speech, not incumbent business models. 
Government regulation that decentralizes control over innovation and 
knowledge production does not necessarily violate the First Amendment 
and may even be required to promote its central values. As Justice Black 
put it, “Freedom of the press from governmental interference under the 
First Amendment does not sanction repression of that freedom by private 
interests.”22 
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III. TWO BIG IDEAS 
There are two big ideas that I want you to take away from this 
Essay. The first is that it is important to think in terms of knowledge and 
information policy.
23
 Think about our valued individual liberties of 
freedom of speech, press, and assembly not in isolation, but in the larger 
context of policies for the spread and growth of knowledge and 
information. 
We usually talk about the First Amendment not as a policy but as 
an individual right. But I also want you to see it as an integral part of 
knowledge and information policy. Why? Because many parts of 
information policy cannot easily be cashed out in terms of individual 
rights. You do not have an individual right to have the government 
create public libraries. The Constitution did not require the early 
Congress to subsidize newspaper delivery. You do not have an 
individual right to government decisions about how much to invest in 
science in fiscal year 2011. You do not have an individual right to have 
fiber optic cable brought to your neighborhood, or to have particular 
frequencies of the electromagnetic spectrum sold at auction, handed out 
in the form of licenses, or made into a commons for spread-spectrum 
technologies. These are policy choices. They are decisions about 
institutions and technological design. And they are crucial to your 
practical ability to speak in a digital world. 
The second big idea is that individual freedoms of speech, press, 
and assembly require an infrastructure of free expression.
24
 That 
infrastructure includes technologies of communication, policies that 
promote innovation and diffusion of knowledge, the institutions of civil 
society that create knowledge and help ensure its quality, and 
government and private investments in science, education, and 
communications technology. 
I began this Essay with the example of an infrastructure built by a 
Persian monarch. These days, however, the infrastructure of free 
expression is not primarily controlled by kings and dictators. 
Increasingly it is in the hands of powerful private corporations like 
Facebook, Google, Yahoo, Verizon, Comcast, and Cisco; they create and  
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maintain the architectures, networks, and platforms through which 
everyone else communicates. 
In fact, governments often work in cooperation with the companies 
that control digital content and digital telecommunications networks. 
Knowledge and information policy—and power over knowledge and 
information—is increasingly the product of coordination between state 
power and private power. 
How are these two ideas—information policy and infrastructure—
related? Think about the title of this Essay: The First Amendment Is an 
Information Policy. What I mean is this: The First Amendment is a 
crucial information policy in a democracy, but it is also only one 
information policy among many others. Constitutional guarantees of free 
expression are a necessary part of knowledge and information policy for 
a democratic information state, but they are not sufficient. To understand 
free expression in the digital age, we must grasp this central truth. Good 
policy and good design promote democracy and a democratic culture; 
bad policy and bad design foster oligarchy, aristocracy, and even 
totalitarianism. 
I want to offer two examples of how the infrastructure of free 
expression is crucial to democracy in the Internet age. Both of them take 
place outside of the United States. Both of them show the powerful role 
of infrastructure in a networked world. And both of them serve as 
lessons for why we must keep our own infrastructure of expression free 
and open in this country. 
IV. THE INFRASTRUCTURE OF DEMOCRATIC PROTESTS 
My first example takes place where King Xerxes implemented his 
information policy thousands of years ago: in the Middle East, including 
King Xerxes‟s own kingdom of Persia, which is now called Iran. 
In 2009 following a disputed election, Iranian citizens took to the 
streets in massive protests, which took months for the government to 
subdue. The unrest is sometimes called the “Twitter Revolution,” 
because social media like Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube played a 
prominent role. In late 2010, massive protests began in Tunisia, and in 
late January 2011, protests broke out in Egypt, and spread to about a 
dozen countries around the Middle East, including Iran. 
The infrastructure of free expression—in this case, digital networks 
and software platforms—played an important role in these uprisings; so 
much so that Egypt shut down access to the Internet and cell phones for 
about five days. By that point in the uprising, however, it was too late. 
Reporters were already in Egypt, mass-media coverage by Al Jazeera 
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and other broadcasters continued, and a few Egyptians still found ways 
to communicate with the outside world. 
If anything, the protests merely got worse after the government 
tried to flip the Internet kill switch. Egyptians were outraged by the loss 
of communications. Business interests objected vehemently, and access 
was soon restored. Egypt‟s long-time strong man, Hosni Mubarak, was 
forced out of office, and the Egyptian military took control of a caretaker 
government. 
We do not yet know whether the January 2011 revolution will lead 
to real democracy in Egypt. Nor do we know what will happen in the 
various other Middle Eastern countries where protests have sprung up. 
What we can ask is what role the infrastructure of free expression, and 
control over that infrastructure, have played. 
People tend to think of democracy as a single thing, but it is 
actually a set of interconnected activities: deliberating, debating, 
spreading information, organizing like-minded individuals, forming and 
maintaining political parties and civil society organizations, protesting, 
petitioning, picketing, voting in elections, and governing. Changes in 
technology and infrastructure make some of these activities of 
democracy harder or easier, more expensive or less expensive, easier to 
control or harder to control. To understand how the Internet affects 
democracy, always ask: How does technology affect specific or 
particular activities of democracy? Does it make them more prominent 
or less prominent, easier or harder, less costly or more costly, less 
vulnerable, or more vulnerable to centralized control? 
Since the 2009 Twitter Revolution there has been almost 
continuous debate about whether the Internet or digital technologies 
“caused” the uprisings in the Middle East.25 It is unhelpful to debate the 
question in these terms. At the risk of oversimplification, there are two 
basic ingredients to democratic revolutions: grievances and courage. 
First, people must have a felt sense that the regime has treated its citizens 
badly, and second, people must be willing to stand up to the regime and 
risk ostracism or punishment. These two factors interact. The grievances 
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have to be bad enough that people feel it is worth taking action; courage 
is necessary because protests pose a problem of collective action. One 
lonely protester, or a small number of protesters will easily be crushed: 
they will quickly be arrested, severely punished, or never heard from 
again. People are more likely to take to the streets if they believe that 
others will do so as well. They are more likely to take risks if there is 
strength in numbers. Hence democratic protests, especially in unjust 
regimes, present a problem of collective action that needs to be solved. 
These basic issues are as relevant to the uprising of 1776 as the 
uprisings of 2011. We should ask how digital technology affected the 
formation and the experience of grievance and courage, how it helped 
solve problems of collective action, how it could be employed in 
organizing and conveying information about popular uprisings, and, 
equally important, how governments in the future will likely react to 
these changes. 
I just compared the problems faced by Egyptian protestors today 
with the problems faced by the colonists in 1776. But there is an 
important difference. In 1776, American colonists were armed with 
weapons almost as powerful as the government‟s. They could form 
citizen militias. That‟s not true today in most autocratic states. Often 
citizens can easily be plowed down by government troops if the rulers 
are truly determined to restore order. In fact, often what differentiates 
successful from unsuccessful protests is whether the protesters can 
manage to get the army or the police force on their side, or at least 
persuade the government not to use force against them. If the 
government is sufficiently ruthless, however, and believes that the 
outside world is not paying attention or does not care, then the protests 
will probably be crushed. To succeed, lots of people must know about 
the protests, and it is even better if there are pictures or video, making it 
difficult for the government to attack and suppress protestors. This is the 
media strategy of Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr. 
Mass-media coverage, especially visual coverage, is crucial to the 
success of this strategy. If the government overreacts, media will 
broadcast the events around the country and around the world. The 
ultimate goal is to use the power of social norms and public opinion to 
put the army in a position where it will refuse to attack the citizens, so 
that the regime loses power. This is a dangerous strategy and not always 
successful. This is more or less what happened in Egypt in 2011, but it 
did not happen in China during the Tiananmen Square Massacre in 1989, 
and it did not happen in the recent protests in several of the other Middle 
Eastern states. 
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How do the Internet and social media affect these considerations? 
How do they affect people‟s framing of their grievances, and their 
courage? How do they solve collective action problems and publicize 
government misconduct and overreaction? The answer requires us to 
look at the entire media ecology: not just Facebook and Twitter and 
YouTube, which anyone can participate in, but also more traditional 
types of journalistic organizations like CNN and Al Jazeera. 
First, grievance requires knowledge plus framing: Problems must be 
articulated in a way that people can understand and that motivate them to 
act. It is not enough that bad things happen and that people recognize 
them as bad. People must also see these things as related to what the 
government is doing or failing to do. Access to the Internet allows 
political entrepreneurs to frame the situation; it also creates awareness of 
freer conditions elsewhere. This helps produce both grievance and envy. 
Second, social media lower the costs of informing and organizing 
people quickly. Collective action requires trust—especially collective 
action that might be punished. I will not protest unless I know that other 
people will, too. Social media allow political entrepreneurs to convey the 
message that many people feel upset at the government, and this helps 
create the belief that if ordinary citizens act, others will, too. 
Third, social media allow individuals to report quickly and easily if 
government overreacts to protests or otherwise misbehaves. This 
provides additional sources of grievance and additional motivation. 
Protests of previous government actions—often at funerals and 
memorials—can become important drivers of continuing protest. 
Conversely, reports that the government has been unable to stop protests 
have a snowball effect; they bolster trust and courage and the belief that 
joining in is worth the effort and the risk. 
Fourth, social media and broadcast media are directed both to 
fellow citizens and to the world in general. They help people recognize 
that protests are possible, they lower the costs of collective action, and 
they create a model for others to follow. Social media can inspire 
copycat behavior in other regions of the country and in other countries. 
Fifth, one of the most important functions of media in protest 
movements is to express emotion. Facebook and Twitter are well-
designed to convey short, emotionally charged messages. Like broadcast 
television, YouTube is particularly important, because it allows sound 
and video. This makes experiences vivid, emotional, and more present. It 
personalizes story telling. It makes violence and tragedy seem more real 
than mere textual depictions, no matter how eloquent or elaborate. 
Sixth, in contrast to traditional broadcasters, digital networks are 
decentralized media. Decentralization means that it is more difficult for 
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the government to control what citizens hear or see. A single state-
operated broadcasting network can easily be co-opted or controlled. 
International coverage complicates matters, but a determined state can 
keep most reporters out of the country. But if media is truly 
decentralized, then everyone in the country is a reporter. Cell phone 
cameras and cheap video cameras become part of the infrastructure of 
free expression. 
Moreover, decentralized media supplement what centralized media 
can do. You do not need Al Jazeera or CNN to cover your protest to get 
other people to see it. You can put it on YouTube. Traditional broadcast 
media like the BBC and CNN can repeat these broadcasts, reinforcing 
the work of participatory social media. 
There was no YouTube during the civil rights protests of the 1950s 
and 1960s in the United States. Civil rights protesters depended heavily 
on national mass media to describe what was happening in the South. 
Without extensive coverage by sympathetic media organizations, they 
would probably have been crushed. Instead, mass media made Rosa 
Parks and Martin Luther King, Jr. into national (and international) icons. 
The civil rights movement succeeded in part because protestors were 
able to obtain widespread national and international sympathy after 
Southern law enforcement and defenders of Jim Crow overreacted: Two 
famous examples are Sheriff Bull Connor‟s decision to set fire hoses and 
attack dogs on civil rights protestors, and the police riot on the Edmund 
Pettus Bridge that led to the passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act. 
Seventh, Egypt‟s closing down of the Internet delegitimated the 
government. The reasons why are complicated: 
(1) When Internet access becomes sufficiently widespread in a 
country, it becomes a commonplace utility, like electricity. Perhaps more 
interestingly, it is increasingly understood as akin to a human right. In 
this way the infrastructure becomes part of background assumptions 
about what it means to be free. 
(2) Internet access is a sign of a civilized, developed nation even if 
it is secretly filtered. Countries sign human rights treaties even if they 
violate human rights, because it signifies that they are civilized nations. 
Internet access has the same symbolic meaning. Cutting off Internet 
access completely has the opposite effect; it makes a country a pariah. 
(3) Shutting down the Internet disrupts commerce. Even though 
Egypt kept access open for certain institutions like banks and stock 
exchanges, a wide range of other commerce—including tourism—was 
halted. This delegitimates the nation in the eyes of other countries and 
businesses that operate in many countries. 
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So far, I have described how digital infrastructure lowered the costs 
of the democratic activities of organization, spreading information, 
dissent, and protest. That is only half the story, however. Having 
foreseen the potential of social networks, authoritarian states will surely 
redesign their telecommunications facilities to head off future protest, 
facilitate surveillance, and promote propaganda and misinformation. 
Most autocratic governments are not stupid; they will respond to the 
strategic challenges generated by new information technology in much 
the same way that they respond to changes in military technology. And 
not only autocratic governments. As I will describe later on in this Essay, 
our own country is facing pressures to subtly reshape our information 
infrastructures out of fear of future cyberattacks and terrorist plots, and 
out of pressure by the content industries to prevent the unauthorized use 
of intellectual property. 
Here is the basic idea: governments and protesters are in an arms 
race or an innovation cycle. New innovations in using digital 
technologies for protest lead to new government innovations designed to 
deter protest in advance and prevent future uprisings. 
Because successful protest requires trust and overcoming the costs 
of organization, authoritarian governments can use the Internet to 
destroy trust and make organization more costly. They can block access 
to certain sites or platforms. They can track and spy on protesters. They 
can seek to undermine trust and sow fear and social discord through 
surveillance, propaganda, and misinformation. They can seek to discredit 
their political opponents through faked videos and false rumors. They 
can hinder—or even launch cyberattacks—against outside organizations 
that are trying to help protesters. Finally, governments can use the same 
social media as the protestors to organize their own allies. They can send 
pro-government thugs into the public square to attack demonstrators and 
create civil unrest; then governments can justify the use of military force 
as necessary to stop the rioting and restore order. 
Each new innovation that protesters develop with digital 
technologies prompts governments to consider it in advance and check 
what protesters might do. China designed the Internet to make 
censorship easier and less obtrusive. Put differently, China got into the 
game of digital censorship much earlier and more pervasively than Egypt 
did. 
If you design your telecommunications systems in advance to 
facilitate an authoritarian information state, you do not need to close 
them down and lose legitimacy. You can keep the Internet operating, 
spread misinformation, engage in surveillance, and block or filter 
dissenting voices. Control over conduits is built into Internet access in 
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those states that have the most successful censorship regimes. All other 
things being equal, the earlier you begin to design the conduits to serve 
state functions, the more effective you can be. Later technological 
advances can allow you to layer new surveillance and filtering 
technologies over old ones. But some decisions are best made at the 
beginning, for example, ensuring that only a small number of 
telecommunications providers control access into the country. That way 
the government has very few points of control that it has to worry about. 
Egypt tried to shut down the Internet; China built its Internet so it 
does not have to shut it down. China regulated at the hardware, protocol, 
application, and social levels. It limited permissible telecommunications 
access into the country. It built devices for surveillance and blocking at 
the hardware levels. It has put pressure on the operators of search 
engines to block sites and share data about users. It monitors cybercafés. 
The Chinese government cannot prevent all disfavored information 
from leaking into or out of the country. But it does not have to. It only 
has to shape access for the vast majority of its population, so that only a 
relatively few elites and very technically proficient members of society 
can get information that the government wants to block. 
V. WIKILEAKS 
My second example concerns WikiLeaks. I am less interested in the 
individual personality of Julian Assange than in the larger phenomenon 
that WikiLeaks represents. WikiLeaks symbolizes a new way of doing 
investigative journalism, which cooperates with traditional media 
organizations but is also independent of them. 
Neither traditional media organizations nor nation states—including 
the United States—are particularly happy about these developments. 
Nation states do not like WikiLeaks because they cannot control or co-
opt it as they have learned to do with more traditional forms of 
journalism, including, I am sad to say, American journalism. Traditional 
media organizations do not like WikiLeaks because it challenges and 
competes with their professional vision of how to do journalism. Equally 
important, WikiLeaks significantly undermines traditional organizations‟ 
carefully calibrated long-term relationships with (or less charitably, their 
co-optation by) powerful nation-states like the U.S. government and 
powerful business organizations. 
WikiLeaks began in 2006, obtaining its domain name in October of 
that year, and releasing the first set of documents it received from 
2012] THE FIRST AMENDMENT IS AN INFORMATION POLICY 15 
anonymous sources that December.
26
 WikiLeaks acted as a conduit or 
publisher for other leakers; it did not obtain the documents on its own. It 
did not pick targets based on what we in America think of as benefitting 
the left or the right; rather, it was an equal opportunity annoyer and 
provocateur. Its early releases included information about assassination 
plots by a Somali rebel leader, revelations about corrupt government and 
business practices in various countries, a manual describing operating 
procedures at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, documents describing 
assassinations and disappearances in Kenya, an early draft of an 
international treaty on intellectual property issues, hacked e-mails from 
Sarah Palin‟s Yahoo account, the membership list of the far right British 
National Party, and e-mails from climate scientists that encouraged right-
wing critics of global warming.
27
 
By 2009, WikiLeaks had a global reputation as a muckraking 
institution that exposed corruption or misconduct by governments and by 
powerful business organizations. Accordingly, it won an award from 
Amnesty International in 2009 and received the Freedom of Expression 
Award from Index of Censorship, a British Magazine.
28
 
WikiLeaks‟s reputation, at least in the United States, changed 
dramatically in 2010 when it released four sets of documents about 
American foreign policy. It released a video clip of two American 
Apache attack helicopters firing on people in Iraq, killing twelve people, 
including a Reuters photographer and a driver.
29
 In July 2010, 
WikiLeaks released war logs from Afghanistan; they showed, among 
other things, how the Afghan War looked on the ground and that the 
United States was targeting Taliban leaders for assassination.
30
 None of 




Importantly, WikiLeaks worked with traditional news 
organizations: the New York Times, the Guardian, and Der Spiegel.
32
 
Each organization was provided the documents in advance and given 
time to verify, analyze, and prepare them for release; all of the 
documents were released by the four organizations on the same day.
33
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The first batch included about 77,000 documents, and later WikiLeaks 
released another 15,000 documents after redacting them to remove 
“names of people who might be put in danger.”34 In October, WikiLeaks 
followed up with 400,000 field reports from Iraq that were heavily 
censored and redacted, again working with media organizations.
35
 
Then, at the end of November 2010, WikiLeaks announced that it 
had a cache of over 250,000 diplomatic cables that it would begin 
releasing in small amounts.
36
 The first 220 documents were published on 
November 28th; WikiLeaks worked with El País (Spain), Le Monde 
(France), Der Spiegel (Germany), the Guardian (United Kingdom), and 
the New York Times (United States) (which obtained the documents from 
the Guardian), and sought guidance from the U.S. State Department to 
decide which cables to release and what portions to redact.
37
 Each news 
organization published stories contemporaneous with important releases. 
WikiLeaks estimates that some 130,000 of the 250,000 documents are 
“unclassified,” some 100,000 are labeled “confidential,” about 15,000 
are classified as “secret,” and none are classified as “top secret.”38 
Under the original plan, around 80 to 100 cables would be released 
each day. However, in September 2011, WikiLeaks released the 
remainder of the documents.
39
 It noted that the password that encrypted 
the files had been distributed in a book published by the Guardian in 
February 2011; hence anyone could get access to the entire cache.
40
 
The irony of this negligence is that it confirmed people‟s worst 
fears about WikiLeaks. Yochai Benkler at Harvard Law School did a 
study showing that media repeatedly reported that all 250,000 diplomatic 
cables had been dumped onto the Internet at once in November 2010.
41
 
Media reports generally failed to mention the process of selection and 
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redaction by WikiLeaks and mainstream media organizations, or stated 
the facts in a way that the reader would assume that all the cables were 
released at once.
42
 Pundits and politicians naturally repeated these 
stories, often downplaying or ignoring the coordination between 
WikiLeaks and major journalistic organizations.
43
 But nine months later, 
once it became known that the password to the entire cache had become 
freely available by accident, WikiLeaks actually did publish the 
remainder of the cables un-redacted. 
Given the media presentation of the facts, much of the rhetoric 
about WikiLeaks has been hyperbolic. On December 19, 2010, Vice 
President Joe Biden compared Julian Assange to a “hi-tech terrorist.”44 
Various politicians and pundits, striving to outdo each other, called for 
Assange to be kidnapped, assassinated, or treated as a terrorist or enemy 
combatant; some called for him to be tried for treason, even though he is 
not an American citizen.
45
 
Senator Dianne Feinstein, Chairman of the Senate Intelligence 
Committee, called for Assange to be prosecuted under the Espionage Act 
of 1917,
46
 and the Justice Department quietly began an investigation.
47
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The Espionage Act, passed during the Wilson Administration, was 
employed repeatedly to silence opposition to World War I, and was even 
used to imprison Eugene V. Debs, the Socialist Party candidate for 
President, who received almost a million votes while in prison during the 
1920 elections.
48
 President Harding later commuted his sentence.
49
 
It is worth noting that the Espionage Act has not been used to 
prosecute a media defendant since World War II. The very fact that the 
Justice Department considered prosecution suggests that it does not think 
of WikiLeaks as a media organization engaged in journalism, but rather 
has framed the situation as one of hacking or sabotage, which, of course 
raises the question of how one should characterize WikiLeaks‟s partners: 
the New York Times, the Guardian, Le Monde, Der Spiegel, and El Pais. 
My major focus here, however, is on infrastructure. One of the most 
interesting elements of the WikiLeaks story is how private power was 
used to hinder WikiLeaks, and how governments encouraged the private 
parties who control important features of the digital infrastructure to 
assist in censoring WikiLeaks. In other words, this is a story about the 
subtle and not-so-subtle relationships between public and private power 
in the digital age. 
After a series of cyberattacks on its website, WikiLeaks moved its 
operations to Amazon‟s hosting services.50 Senator Joseph Lieberman of 
the Senate‟s Homeland Security Committee criticized companies for 
doing business with WikiLeaks: “No responsible company—whether 
American or foreign—should assist WikiLeaks in its efforts to 
disseminate these stolen materials.”51 Amazon then booted WikiLeaks 
off its site on December 1st.
52
 On December 4th, PayPal cut off the 
account that WikiLeaks used to collect donations.
53
 On December 6th, 
MasterCard stopped making payments to WikiLeaks, followed by Visa 
on December 7th.
54
 In each case, WikiLeaks scrambled to find new 
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facilities for hosting, domain name access, and financial payment 
systems.
55
 It had to: these online facilities are crucial parts of the 
infrastructure that make WikiLeaks‟s model of journalism possible. 
The Obama Administration ordered WikiLeaks blocked on federal 
computers. It forbade government employees from even visiting the site, 
leading to the interesting result that people who dealt with the 
government were more informed about WikiLeaks and what it had 
disclosed than government officials themselves.
56
 The Washington Post, 
no doubt reflecting the views of government officials, wrote a story 
suggesting that even accessing the site or sites that discussed the cables 




All of this played out just before Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 
gave a well-publicized lecture in January 2010 celebrating Internet 
freedom, the freedom to connect, and the importance of digital 
technologies in making information available in countries that had 
blocked their citizens‟ access to vital information about the way that 
their governments worked. “[D]espite an intense campaign of 
government intimidation,” Clinton noted, without a hint of irony: 
brave citizen journalists in Iran continue using technology to show the 
world and their fellow citizens what is happening inside their country. 
In speaking out on behalf of their own human rights, the Iranian people 
have inspired the world. And their courage is redefining how 
technology is used to spread truth and expose injustice.
58
  
When it came to WikiLeaks exposing embarrassing facts about the 
American government, however, Secretary Clinton was far less 
enthusiastic about Internet freedom; indeed she argued in November 
2010 that the disclosure of the diplomatic cables “is not just an attack on 
America—it‟s an attack on the international community.”59 
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VI. PROSECUTING WIKILEAKS 
I will return to the relationship between public power and private 
intermediaries in a moment. But before I do, you may be wondering 
whether the government can prosecute Assange and WikiLeaks 
consistent with the First Amendment. 
In the Pentagon Papers case, New York Times v. United States,
60
 the 
Supreme Court Justices agreed that the government could not halt the 
publication of the Pentagon Papers.
61
 These documents described how 
the United States got involved in the Vietnam War, and contained a lot 
of embarrassing materials that probably undermined U.S. diplomatic 
efforts. Daniel Ellsberg, a government contractor who worked for the 
RAND Corporation, had leaked the papers to the New York Times and 
(later) the Washington Post. The Supreme Court refused to enjoin 
publication, applying a version of the old “clear and present danger” test 
that goes back to the beginning of the twentieth century. Justice Potter 
Stewart‟s concurrence explained that the test was whether “disclosure of 
[the papers] will surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable 
damage to our Nation or its people.”62 
Justice Black connected the dots between the purposes of the First 
Amendment and the goals of information policy, arguing that the First 
Amendment is an information policy for democracy:  
The press was to serve the governed, not the governors. The 
Government‟s power to censor the press was abolished so that the 
press would remain forever free to censure the Government. The press 
was protected so that it could bare the secrets of government and 
inform the people. Only a free and unrestrained press can effectively 
expose deception in government. And paramount among the 
responsibilities of a free press is the duty to prevent any part of the 
government from deceiving the people and sending them off to distant 
lands to die of foreign fevers and foreign shot and shell.
63
  
In this case Justice Black was pretty clearly talking about the Vietnam 
War, but one could easily apply the same logic to more recent events in 
the past, including our country‟s response to the 9/11 attacks and the 
decision to go to war in Iraq. 
I have no idea what Justice Black would have thought of 
WikiLeaks. I think, however, that he would find the government‟s 
response, and especially Senator Lieberman‟s call for private parties to 
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try to silence WikiLeaks, to be constitutionally troublesome. Remember 
that in Associated Press, Justice Black argued that although “[f]reedom 
to publish is guaranteed by the Constitution, . . . freedom to combine to 
keep others from publishing is not.”64 
The Pentagon Papers case is different from the WikiLeaks case in 
several important respects, however. First, unlike the New York Times, 
Assange acted outside the United States, and it is not clear if he could be 
extradited. Second, it‟s not clear how American criminal law applies 
extraterritorially. 
Third, and most important for our purposes, in the Pentagon Papers 
case, President Richard Nixon sought an injunction to prevent further 
publication, and the Court rejected the request on the grounds that the 
injunction would act as an unconstitutional prior restraint on the press.
65
 
However, several of the Justices noted that various federal statutes, 
including the 1917 Espionage Act, were available for a criminal 
prosecution after the fact.
66
 
Perhaps, then, the constitutional standard for a criminal prosecution 
following publication might be lower. But it is likely that some version 
of the “clear and present danger” test applies even to a subsequent 
criminal prosecution. As the Court explained in Bartnicki v. Vopper,
67
 a 
recent case involving a taped conversation leaked to a radio program, “if 
a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of 
public significance then state officials may not constitutionally punish 
publication of the information, absent a need . . . of the highest order.”68 
The government can prosecute government employees or 
contractors who leak information to the press, but the government cannot 
punish the press if it obtained the information lawfully and merely 
published what was leaked unless there would almost certainly be very 
serious harm to the nation. In this case, there has been no showing yet 
that the WikiLeaks revelations meet that standard. In fact, then-Secretary 
of Defense Robert Gates had more or less admitted that although the 
revelations in the cables are embarrassing, they were not life threatening 
and did not seriously harm national security. As Gates put it, “Is this 
embarrassing? Yes. Is it awkward? Yes. Consequences for U.S. foreign 
policy? I think fairly modest.”69 
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Compare the WikiLeaks disclosures to the New York Times‟s 2005 
disclosure of the Bush Administration‟s secret domestic surveillance 
program (which, in my opinion, almost certainly violated federal law). 
The Bush Administration and its allies insisted that the story would 
seriously jeopardize our intelligence gathering operations and damage 
our efforts in the war on terror. Yet the Bush Administration never tried 
to prosecute the New York Times for the disclosures. Indeed, the Nixon 
Administration never sought to prosecute either the New York Times or 
the Washington Post after the release of the Pentagon Papers. 
Is there anything that distinguishes Assange from the New York 
Times and the Washington Post? He is not an employee of a traditional 
professional journalistic organization. But the doctrine of clear and 
present danger does not turn on that distinction. Moreover, it is worth 
noting that Assange has been working with the New York Times, the 
Guardian, and other European newspapers. It‟s hard to justify 
prosecuting Assange if you are not going to prosecute the newspapers he 
has been working with. 
To be sure, the government can prosecute the original leaker. We 
believe that the leaker was Private Bradley Manning, and the 
government has gone after Manning with a vengeance. For months it 
kept him in solitary confinement in a military prison in Quantico, 




Manning has been deliberately punished well before he is ever 
convicted of a crime, and he has been subjected to extremely harsh 
conditions that are not necessary to prevent his escape. Indeed, after a 
State Department official, P.J. Crowley, remarked that the treatment of 
Manning was “ridiculous and counterproductive and stupid,” he was 
forced to resign because his remarks required President Obama to 
publicly defend the Pentagon‟s actions.71 
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What is going on? Two things. First, the government cannot 
prosecute WikiLeaks constitutionally if WikiLeaks merely received 
Manning‟s leaks. But it might be a different story if WikiLeaks 
conspired with Manning to leak the materials. So one possible reason for 
the harsh treatment of Manning is to get him to tell the government that 
WikiLeaks conspired with him. 
There are two problems with this approach. First, if Manning does 
tell the government that there was a conspiracy, the question would then 
naturally arise whether his confession was legitimate or was the result of 
coercion and inhumane treatment. 
Second, the conspiracy theory is very difficult to distinguish from 
what professional journalists do. Professional journalists work with 
whistleblowing sources to get them to release leaks, often coaxing them 
and offering to help them over extended periods of time. It may be hard 
to distinguish the government‟s theory from what Bob Woodward and 
Carl Bernstein did for Deep Throat in their coverage of the Watergate 
scandal, or indeed, what a wide range of investigative journalists do in 
coaxing information from disgruntled sources who provide leaks of 
sensitive government information. 
A second possible reason for Manning‟s harsh treatment is more 
likely, but also more troubling. The government may realize that it 
cannot prosecute non-government employees once sensitive information 
is leaked to them. Instead, they must simply redouble their efforts to 
ensure that leaks do not occur. (This is Justice Stewart‟s point in the 
Pentagon Papers case.)
72
 If that is so, then the harsh treatment visited on 
Manning before conviction is a message to all other government 
employees. Mess with us, the government is saying, and we will most 
assuredly mess with you, and we will not even have to convict you of a 
crime to do it. Rather, we will throw you into a dark cell in solitary 
confinement and slowly drive you mad. 
None of this is to underestimate the seriousness of what Manning 
has been accused of. If he is found guilty, he should be punished. The 
point is that he should not be singled out as an example and punished 
before he is convicted. 
VII. THE DIFFERENCE INFRASTRUCTURE MAKES 
The story of WikiLeaks, like the story of the Egyptian protests, is 
about the infrastructure of free expression and how it helps or hinders the 
activities of democracy. 
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The government did not seek an injunction against WikiLeaks 
largely because the digital infrastructure makes it futile. Assange did not 
have to rely on the facilities of a major newspaper to publish his 
revelations. He created mirror sites in multiple countries around the 
world that made it impossible to block all of his copies. He worked with 
newspapers for a different reason: to give himself political cover. 
Yochai Benkler has pointed out another important feature of the 
new digital infrastructure: Once the leaker (we assume Private Manning) 
uploaded the materials on the WikiLeaks website, Assange could not be 
co-opted in the same way that traditional media organizations could.
73
 
Assange picked newspapers in different countries and promised them a 
scoop in their countries in return for helping him sort through the 
materials. Because the papers knew that someone else in their country 
would get the scoop if they refused, they had incentives to cooperate. 
And because Assange worked with multiple newspapers in different 
countries, his disclosures would not be prevented if one or two of them 
were co-opted by their governments. 
Compare this with the New York Times‟s revelation of the Bush 
Administration‟s secret domestic surveillance program. It is likely that 
President Bush and his associates had violated the law; at the very least, 
there is a strong argument that they had improperly gone around the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.
74
 Nevertheless, the Bush 
Administration convinced the Times to delay publication until well after 
the 2004 election, possibly helping George W. Bush win a second term 
as President.
75
 Why did the Times agree to delay publication? It was 
probably a complicated set of reasons: a personal request from the 
President, a sense of patriotism, and a desire to maintain the access and 
contacts with government that contemporary journalists crave. Today, 
major news organizations depend on a series of leaks and background 
information from government officials, and they do not want to bite the 
hand that feeds them too often or too hard. 
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The Obama Administration had no such leverage over Assange and 
WikiLeaks. Even if the Administration co-opted the Times, there were 
plenty of other papers to take its place, and Assange could publish the 
materials himself without anyone‟s permission. Indeed, the Obama 
Administration refused to deal with Assange directly, although it was 
apparently willing to talk to its acquaintances at traditional papers like 
the Times. 
Daniel Ellsberg, the leaker in the Pentagon Papers case, faced a 
very different infrastructure of free expression in 1971. The key 
technological innovation in his day was the copying machine. Ellsberg 
made his copies using a Xerox copier in an advertising agency.
76
 This 
was a long and cumbersome process, and Ellsberg later remarked that if 




Ellsberg first tried to get the Pentagon Papers read on the Senate 
floor, where they would be protected by the Constitution‟s Speech or 
Debate Clause.
78
 When that failed he went to the New York Times. After 
a federal district court issued an injunction against the New York Times, 
he sent copies to the Washington Post and then to several other papers, 
which began publishing the papers one after the other.
79
 
This was actually an early version of WikiLeaks‟ strategy. Each 
newspaper had incentives to participate because each circulated in a 
different geographical area. Ellsberg hoped that the Nixon 
Administration would not or could not go after all of the country‟s major 
newspapers at once. 
Even so, it was a dangerous game in the pre-Internet world. First, 
all of the newspapers were located in one country. If the Supreme Court 
ruled against any one paper, that was the end of the game. Second, there 
were a finite number of copies, and making new ones—and distributing 
them to new locations—took time. If the government could enjoin the 
papers and round the copies up quickly enough, Ellsberg might not be 
able to create more and place them in secure locations. Third, unlike 
Assange, the publisher in the WikiLeaks case, Ellsberg did not own his 
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own newspaper or broadcasting facility. He relied on the mass-media 
distribution of newspapers. 
WikiLeaks is the beginning of a new model of journalism that uses 
digital networks to obtain sensitive information anonymously, secure it 
in multiple sites, and publish it in defiance of territorial governments. 
Although WikiLeaks itself may not survive in its current form, similar 
organizations have sprung up around the Internet, and more are likely to 
follow. Later innovators will no doubt improve on the techniques 
pioneered by WikiLeaks and attempt to learn from its mistakes. 
Traditional media organizations will eventually join this trend: 
They will create and install their own anonymous file depositories and 
form cooperatives with other newspapers around the world. Conversely, 
NGOs (non-governmental organizations) like the American Civil 
Liberties Union will do an increasing amount of what is now called 
investigative journalism: obtaining documents, processing them, and 
releasing them to the press. In the twentieth century, professional 
journalists, NGOs, and ordinary citizens had different and clearly 
demarcated functions and activities; that is giving way to a new 
decentralized system in which other actors become more like traditional 
journalism organizations and traditional journalism organizations 
become more like WikiLeaks and NGOs. As this happens, professional 
identities and professional norms will change. 
Monroe Price has pointed out that most countries not only have 
internal policies for regulating their own media, they also have policies 
for regulating the media of other countries.
80
 Countries want to affect the 
knowledge and information circulating in other nations.
81
 During the 
Cold War, for example, the United States invested in Radio Free Europe, 
Radio Liberty, and Radio Marti to influence Eastern Europe, Central 
Asia, the Middle East, and Cuba. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton‟s 
speech on global Internet policy shows that the United States believes 
that it is in our interest to promote Internet freedom and the 
dissemination of information in other countries, especially countries 
which the United States disagrees with.
82
 
Taking Price‟s insight one step further, we might say that the 
Internet allows each individual, or each NGO, to have its own media 
policy, giving people in other countries information that their  
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governments do not want them to have. That includes the United States. 
The United States, naturally, does not like it one bit. 
In discussing the Middle East protests, I noted that governments 
and protestors are in an arms race or an innovation cycle. Just as China 
has worked to design its infrastructure to undermine protest, 
governments will seek to find new ways to undermine WikiLeaks and its 
successors. 
Divide these techniques into “old school” and “new school” forms 
of censorship. “Old school” censorship means enjoining publications, 
taking control of newspapers and television stations, and rounding 
people up, either to prevent them from speaking, or to teach others a 
lesson that the government is not to be messed with. As I said, I think 
this is what the U.S. government is doing in the case of Bradley 
Manning. 
“New school” censorship tries to control the digital infrastructure of 
free expression; it leverages privately owned networks and employs 
public-private cooperation. It may prove just as effective in the long run. 
First, states can use their power over information infrastructure to 
insert government controls and surveillance technologies into the 
infrastructure. They can order businesses who control elements of the 
infrastructure to hinder, delay, block or censor content and speakers. 
These parties include the owners of telecommunications facilities like 
Verizon, technology companies like Cisco, domain name registrars like 
GoDaddy, website hosting services like Amazon, institutions of 
electronic commerce like MasterCard and PayPal, platform owners like 
Blogger, Facebook, or Twitter, and search engines like Google. These 
are all potential private censors, and thus they are all potential targets of 
government control. 
Second, instead of direct orders, the government can coax, 
persuade, or signal to private owners of the information infrastructure to 
hinder or block offending publications and speakers. This allows the 
government to assert that private parties are doing the censoring, not the 
state itself. And because it is private censorship, we should respect it, 
first because the market will check any abuses, and second, because 
corporations have free speech rights to own and control the 
infrastructure. 
What is new here is the use of the various elements of the digital 
infrastructure—telecommunications conduits, servers, domain name 
registrars, and payment systems—to censor. The strategy of government 
officials coaxing or signaling private parties to censor, by contrast, is not 
new at all. It was used, for example, during the McCarthy period, when  
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private parties blacklisted people for fear of being thought communist 
sympathizers. 
Both direct control of infrastructure and public-private cooperation 
were used in the Middle East and in China. Both are fully available to 
the United States, and, moreover, the United States is currently 
employing them. The strategies of the new digital censorship in other 
parts of the world are not as dissimilar from what we do in the United 
States as you might think. The greatest threat to freedom of speech today 
is not simply that of public power or private power. It is their  
potent combination. 
The Hugo Black of the Associated Press case in 1941—who was 
worried about the power of private combinations to suppress speech—
turns out to be just as important to understanding free speech on the 
Internet today as the Hugo Black of the Pentagon Papers case in 1971, 
who was worried about government prosecution. 
We criticize Yahoo when it capitulates to China. We should also 
criticize Amazon and PayPal when they capitulate to Joe Lieberman, just 
as we should criticize Senator Lieberman himself for making appeals 
that he would never direct at the New York Times, the Guardian, or Der 
Spiegel. If Senator Lieberman had suggested that MasterCard stop 
processing the New York Times‟s subscriptions or that Amazon stop 
hosting its content on its servers, people would have thought he was  
a lunatic. 
Despite the pressure, however, WikiLeaks was able to find new 
intermediaries to work with. The resilience of WikiLeaks suggests how 
crucial certain features of digital infrastructure can be to freedom of 
speech. The network as currently organized does not respect national 
boundaries. It is decentralized, redundant, flexible, plastic, and allows 
for many competitors and services. But that free speech-friendly design 
is not guaranteed in the future. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Right now there is enormous pressure in the United States to build 
back doors to allow surveillance on Internet networks and digital 
platforms in the United States, and to implement technologies that will 
make it easy for governments and corporations to filter content and 
block access to disfavored content.
83
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The pressure on the United States to do these things is not coming 
from authoritarian strongmen in the Middle East. It is not coming from 
the People‟s Republic of China. It is coming from our government and 
from the content industry. The government is worried about potential 
criminal activities and terrorist networks that use Skype, Facebook, and 
Gmail. The content industry is worried about file sharing and intellectual 
property. Meanwhile, telecommunications and broadband companies, 
which oppose some of these proposals, have their own shopping list: 
they want to protect the right to block and filter traffic that interferes 
with their business models or to favor traffic by their business partners. 
That is why the industry vigorously opposes network neutrality. 
The danger in these proposals is that, however well-intentioned, 
they may also threaten the American infrastructure of free expression. 
Building networks that allow you to filter for intellectual property also 
allows you to filter for anticompetitive reasons, or even for ideological 
reasons. Implementing broadband technologies to slow and block traffic 
that your business partners do not like allows slowing and blocking 
traffic for other reasons as well. 
Moreover, building a back door into everyday online 
communications means building a surveillance system into every aspect 
of our lives that uses digital communications systems, ranging from e-
mail to Facebook to gaming software to Google Docs. If the government 
required that building contractors install bugs and hidden cameras in 
every home or apartment, people would object strenuously even if the 
government assured them that the bugs and cameras would only be 
turned on when the government had very good reasons. 
Building a backdoor greatly lowers the costs of routine surveillance. 
In the pre-digital world the government had to decide whether the cost of 
a wiretap or a surveillance stakeout was worth the manpower and the 
expense. When government builds surveillance into digital 
communications systems, the cost of surveillance, including unnecessary 
surveillance, declines rapidly, so it is reasonable to expect that there will 
be more of it. And if there will be more of it, it is imperative to design 
systems to help ensure that surveillance is not abused. 
The same is true of proposals to require that broadband providers 
install filtering systems or deep packet inspection systems to look for 
contraband intellectual property. Once these facilities are built into a 
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system, they greatly reduce the costs of blocking, filtering, and  
censoring. Designing an infrastructure in this way shifts the cost of 
surveillance and censorship away from government and onto citizens. 
The First Amendment is an information policy for democracy, but it 
is only one information policy among many. It needs the assistance of an 
infrastructure of free expression to make good on its promises. The fight 
over free speech today, around the world, is a fight over how that 
infrastructure will be designed and implemented. If we want to preserve 
a free Internet, we must have networks that cannot easily be abused in 
the future. We must design democratic values into the infrastructure of 
free expression if we want an infrastructure that protects democracy. 
